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CA-89:06
                              CERT Advisory Update
                                October 18, 1989
                             DEC/Ultrix 3.0 Systems
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------


This is a repost of the Ultrix 3.0 advisory.  We have received the sum
output for DECstations.
=============================================================================

Recently, the CERT/CC has been working with several Unix sites that have
experienced breakins.  Running tftpd, accounts with guessable passwords
or no passwords, and known security holes not being patched have been the
bulk of the problems.

The intruder, once in, gains root access and replaces key programs
with ones that create log files which contain accounts and passwords in
clear text.  The intruder then returns and collects the file.  By using
accounts which are trusted on other systems the intruder then installs
replacement programs which start logging.

There have been many postings about the problem from several other net
users.  In addition to looking for setuid root programs in users' home
directories, hidden directories '..  ' (dot dot space space), and a modified
telnet program, we have received two reports from Ultrix 3.0 sites that
the intruders are replacing the /usr/bin/login program.  The Ultrix security
hole being used in these attacks is only found in Ultrix 3.0.

Suggested steps:
	1) Check for a bogus /usr/bin/login.  The sum program should report
	   the following for the DEC supplied login program.
		27379    67	for VAXstation Ultrix 3.0
        	35559   116     for DECstation Ultrix 3.0

	2) Check for a bogus /usr/etc/telnetd.  The sum program should report
	   the following for the DEC supplied telnetd program.
		23552    47	for VAXstation Ultrix 3.0
        	45355    84     for DECstation Ultrix 3.0

	3) Look for .savacct in either /usr/etc or in users' directories.
	   This may be the file that the new login program creates.  It
	   could have a different name on your system.

	4) Upgrade to Ultrix 3.1 ASAP.

	5) Monitor accounts for users having passwords that can be found in
	   the /usr/dict/words file or have simple passwords like a persons
	   name or their account name.

	6) Search through the file system for programs that are setuid root.

	7) Disable or modify the tftpd program so that anonymous access to
	   the file system is prevented.

If you find that a system that has been broken into,  changing the password
on the compromised account is not sufficient.  The intruders do remove copies
of the /etc/passwd file in order to break the remaining passwords.  It is best
to change all of the passwords at one time.  This will prevent the intruders
from using another account.

Please alert CERT if you do find a problem.

Thank you,
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

Internet: cert@cert.org
Telephone: 412-268-7090 24-hour hotline: CERT personnel answer
           7:30a.m.-6:00p.m. EST, on call for
           emergencies other hours.

Past advisories and other information are available for anonymous ftp
from cert.org (192.88.209.5).

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